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Abstract
This paper explores how wealth and inequality can affect self-governed solutions to commons
dilemmas by constraining group cooperation. It reports a series of experiments in the field where
subjects are actual commons users. Household data about the participants’ context explain statistically
the usually observed wide variation found within and across groups in similar experiments.
Participants’ wealth and inequality reduced cooperation when groups were allowed to have face-to-
face communication between rounds. There are implications for a greater awareness of nonpayoff
asymmetries affecting cooperation in heterogeneous groups, apart from heterogeneity in the payoffs
structure of the game.
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1. Introduction
How do poverty and inequality affect the capabilities of communities to overcome the
tragedy of the commons? Could societies rely upon the rural poor to manage sustainably
local commons that may provide benefits to others? The incentives to overuse common-
pool resources are well understood, and a variety of market and state-based solutions have
been advanced and put into effect with various levels of success. There is also evidence
that in some circumstances, in fact, members of a community may voluntarily cooperate to
produce a socially superior outcome (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1994; Berkes, 1989;
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This paper explores how wealth and other related factors of group composition may affect
the likelihood of cooperation and self-governance in a local commons dilemma by using
evidence from field experiments conducted in three rural villages in Colombia.
In particular, this paper presents evidence that the actual levels and composition of
wealth,aswellastherealworldoccupationoftheparticipantsintheexperiments,playarole
in the level of cooperation and the solution of the local commons dilemma they faced
through the experiment sessions. At the group level, we found that group efficiency im-
proved for nearly all groups when introducing face-to-face communication, quite consistent
with most experimental evidence in public goods and CPR experiments. However, and also
consistent with previous experiments (Ostrom et al., 1994), the gains in efficiency varied
greatlyacrossgroupsdespitehavingfacedthesametreatmentdesignandpayoffsincentives.
The data collected on the real world institutions and behavior help explain part of this
variability. In brief, the most interesting and significant results are that at the group level,
both average group wealth and variance in the distribution of wealth decreased the level of
social efficiency achieved by the groups. At a micro level, such relations are confirmed by
statistical analysis showing that individuals were less likely to cooperate if their individual
wealth was higher and their economic activity was less dependent on local commons
dilemmas,supportingthegrouplevelrelationbetweengroupefficiencyandgroup’saverage
wealth. Further, individuals were less likely to cooperate if they showed a larger ‘wealth
distance’ relative to the average wealth of the other seven participants in the group,
particularly if they were in the lower percentile in the wealth distribution, supporting the
relation between the variance in group wealth and group efficiency.
2. Debates on inequality, heterogeneity and the solution to local commons dilemmas
How wealth and inequality play a role on the level of cooperation in collective action
dilemmas remains a crucial but open question in the literature, starting with Olson’s (1965)
postulate that the privileged in a group would voluntarily provide the public good in
collective action dilemmas
1. New empirical and theoretical works suggest, however, that
unequal distributions of wealth or heterogeneity within group members can reduce their
capacity to coordinate their actions towards Pareto superior outcomes. One argument is
that heterogeneity, wealth inequality and social distance in a group can hinder key triggers
of cooperation and collective action such as reciprocity and trust in the solution of these
1 In the case of public goods, Bergstrom et al. (1986) have also proposed that individuals with higher
incomes would increase contributions, while those with lower would free-ride on the provision by the rich.
However, there are basic structural differences between a commons dilemma and a public good contributions one,
being the former the focus of this paper. Not only is the choice variable in one dilemma a mirror of the other, that
is, while individuals extract from a common pool in the first, they contribute to the provision of a public good in
the other, but other more critical differences must be taken into account. Unless explicitly constructed otherwise,
the provision of the public good is based in a linear function of the sum of contributions, while the commons
dilemmas usually involve a quadratic or at least a concave function on the sum of individual extraction decisions.
The model used here, however, involves features from both types of problems and in a sense could be considered
an impure nonlinear public goods problem as will be discussed later on.
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Bardhan et al., in press; Ostrom, 1998; Varughese and Ostrom, 2001). Some have also
suggested that there might be a quadratic relationship between inequality and cooperation,
as developed theoretically by Dayton-Johnson (1997) and Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan
(in press), where conservation of the conservation of the commons emerges at very low or
very high levels of wealth inequality but not as much in the middle; Molinas (1998) has
also explored empirically such nonlinear relation regarding cooperation and wealth for a
sample of rural cooperatives in Paraguay.
Inthecaseofruralvillagesusingcommon-poolresources(CPRs),communitiesdisplaya
variety of types of heterogeneity regarding, for instance, the marginal net gains of using the
commons by each individual. Some may have better equipment to extract the resource,
reducing their effort cost relative to others. Some may need more of the resource because of
theirhigherextractioncostsorendowmentofequipment.Thosewithbetterexitoptionssuch
as better land or better education might gain comparatively less from resource harvesting,
while others may derive most of their income from the resource. Most of the literature
available on how inequality affects cooperation in these dilemmas has focused on this
general notion that asymmetries in different components of the material benefits and costs
fortheusersmaysupportorrejecttheOlsonianproposition.Infact,Sandler(1992)develops
furtherOlson’spropositionsandshowsthattherelationbetweenheterogeneityinthepayoffs
structures and collective action can go either way depending on the assumptions about the
publicgoodproduction function.Elsewhere,Idiscussindetailsuchliterature
2,andtestsuch
arguments with another set of experiments in the same three villages introducing these
asymmetries in the payoffs function of the players (Cardenas et al., 2002).
However, individuals’ willingness to cooperate might also depend on a set of
nonmaterial incentives involved in the solution of these dilemmas (Crawford and Ostrom,
1995; Ostrom, 2000). Shared values and norms (Ostrom, 1998, 2000) are key triggers of
cooperation, and communication among members is a facilitator of these. When contracts
are incomplete, as in CPR dilemmas, individuals depend greatly on information about
other group members’ history and on their own history and reputation so that an
institutional environment of ‘community’ or social capital emerges (Cardenas and Ostrom,
2001). This information affects directly the possibility of building trust and reciprocity,
which are key for cooperation, and wealth composition in a group may determine the way
such information affects decisions.
A plausible approach for testing empirically these different propositions is through
economic experiments, where one can study how changes in certain institutions and
incentive structures affect individual behavior and group outcomes. In fact, some attempts
have been made by experimentalists to study the effects on cooperation of different types
of heterogeneity and social distance manipulated in the experimental laboratory. Hoffmann
2 Varughese and Ostrom (2001) and Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (2002) have reviewed the wide range of
factors that may be involved in the relation between heterogeneity and the solutions to commons dilemmas.
Recent theoretical models suggesting that cooperation in local commons dilemmas may decrease with inequality
can be found in Baland and Platteau (1997a,b), Bardhan et al. (1998), Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan (2002) and
De Janvry et al. (1998). A more recent workshop at the SantaFe Institute was devoted entirely to such relation (see
http://discuss.santafe.edu/sustainability).
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Schmitt et al. (2000) and Hackett et al. (1994) have shown through different types of
experiments how group heterogeneity affects in various ways cooperation, often in
contradiction with the propositions by Olson (1965) or Bergstrom et al. (1986). Hoffman
et al. (1996) showed how increasing the social distance between the subjects in a dictator
game reduced the offers by subjects in the role of dictators to other participants. Kramer
and Brewer (1984) argue that individuals might be prone to cooperate more when there is a
greater sense of group identity, which is probably stronger in more homogenous groups
where members develop a group identity based on what they are, do or have. Kollock
(1998) reports a series of experiments where the membership to the same fraternity, a
different one or no membership makes a significant difference in the level of cooperation
by college students despite the symmetry in the material incentives. Notice that such
values are brought to the lab, and not experimentally induced, and constitute key
information people use in their decision.
Other empirical works also are relevant here. Alesina and La Ferrara (1999) show,
using a General Social Survey (1974–1994) sample from US citizens, that the partic-
ipation in social activities decreases in more unequal and more racially or ethnically
heterogeneous groups. They also cite results from La Ferrara (1998) data from Tanzania
where ‘‘the degree of participation in groups which provide economic benefits or informal
insurance to their members is inversely related to income inequality in the community’’.
The focus here is on how heterogeneity among subjects, based on their social and
economic conditions, may affect cooperation not because of asymmetries in the material
payoffs, but because of variations in the effort costs that the group incurs to achieve a
socially efficient outcome through self-governed mechanisms. These transaction costs of
self-governance could be affected by the nonmonetary values that players may place on
the costs and benefits of cooperating or defecting on the others in the group, even if they
face symmetric benefits and costs from using the local commons.
To study this, we used an experimental setting where the material incentives were
symmetric for all players, but where we observe other types of heterogeneity (e.g. across
individuals’ perceptions, values, history and reputation) that could affect the mechanisms
that communities use for overcoming these dilemmas (e.g. trust, reciprocity, social
distance, shared norms, etc.) and that have been shown to explain successful collective
action (Ostrom, 2000). Instead of manipulating these effects artificially through exper-
imental institutions or incentives, we observed them from the real context of the subjects,
i.e. we gathered information on the actual wealth and other social and economic
characteristics of the participants and studied if they may bring such information into
the field lab, by exploring possible relations between these and their experimental behavior
and outcomes. Since each group of eight people was composed of neighbors from the
same community who had a previous history mostly known to each other, and since we
allowed the groups to have face-to-face discussions as a space for devising self-enforced
mechanisms, the design allowed us to create a rather realistic but controlled environment
of social exchange among the participants.
Through these exercises, we replicated in the field lab some of the existing exper-
imental evidence on cooperation in groups facing CPR dilemmas (Ostrom et al., 1994;
Ledyard, 1995). We also expanded the evidence, however, by learning more about the set
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outcome in the field laboratory. We believe that we can explain part of the rather wide and
puzzling variability usually found in these types of experiments by accounting for some of
the real characteristics and context of the subjects.
3. A field experiment to study local commons dilemmas
The experimental setting emulates the actual incentives the participants face in their
daily life where households benefit from harvesting multiple products from a patch of
forest or mangrove where access is rather easy for villagers, despite the particular de jure
property rights over the resources. Usually, the individual’s benefits from a forest are
increasing on one’s extraction of products (e.g. firewood, logging, fishing), but decreasing
with aggregate extraction due to a reduction on public goods benefits from the forest, such
as water supply or biodiversity conservation (Cardenas, 2000).
3.1. Field experimental design: the payoffs table
Following much of the experimental literature on CPR experiments, we designed a
decision-making exercise where a group of players in a group uses a resource for which
there is joint access. Individual payoffs depended on the individual’s choices and the
choices by the rest of the group. Technically, our design is equivalent to a negative group
externality case, and shares the properties of a CPR problem (Ostrom, 1990) where
subtractibility is high and excludability is difficult.
In our decision-making exercise, the resource problem was described in the context of
a forest. Groups of eight players faced the decision to use the same forest from which
they derived direct benefits such as firewood, and indirect benefits such as water quality
and biodiversity preservation. The net gains from choosing a particular individual effort
in extracting forest products are given in Appendix A. The mathematical model from
which the table is derived in detail is shown in Appendix B. Each player received the
same payoff table, and had to choose the number of months she wanted to allocate in
extracting products from the forest (‘‘My months in the forest’’, columns 0 to 8 in
Appendix A). The decision had to be made privately and individually, i.e. it was never
known to the rest of the group during or after the session. Once the players made their
decision and wrote it on a slip of paper, they handed this to the monitor who added the
total group’s months in the forest, which he announced publicly. With that total, each
player knew ‘‘Their months in the forest’’ (rows 0 to 56 in Appendix A) and could
calculate how many points (to be converted to Colombian pesos
3) earned in that
particular round. This procedure was repeated for up to 20 rounds for most of the
groups.
3 At the time of the experiments, the exchange rate was about 1350 pesos per US$1. For an average of 18
rounds, we expected subjects to earn somewhere between one and two minimum wage days of work as
compensation for their participation.
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Appendix A shows clearly the conflict between maximizing individual earnings and
maximizing group earnings. To illustrate this from the standpoint of one of eight players,
suppose each of the other seven players chooses to spend 2 months collecting firewood
from the surrounding forest. Since the sum of the seven players’ choices is 14 months,
Appendix A indicates that the eighth player’s payoff-maximizing choice—the individu-
al’s Nash best response—is to spend 8 months collecting firewood. Note that her payoff
in this outcome is 776 points, while each of the other seven individuals receive 535
points (for each of the other individuals, the sum of the others’ choices is 20 months,
while the individual choice is 2 months). Now, imagine that the eighth player chooses 3
months instead of 8, while the other seven players continue to choose 2 months. This can
be thought of as a group-oriented choice—it is costly because that player’s payoff is now
652 points instead of 776. However, each of the other players’ payoffs increases from
535 points to 606. As for the standard benchmarks, it is straightforward to show that in
this design, the optimal (group payoff maximizing) amount of time each individual
should spend collecting firewood is 1 month (see details of the theoretical model in
Appendix B). On the other hand, since a pure strategy Nash equilibrium requires that
every player’s choice be a best-response to every other player’s best-response, in this
context, the Nash equilibrium is reached if every individual decides to spend 6 months
collecting firewood from the forest. It is worth noting that at the Nash equilibrium,
subjects earn only 155 points, about 24% of the payoffs attainable at the efficient
outcome. Table 1 summarizes the choice variable and outcomes for the two benchmarks
of comparison for our analysis.
3.3. Experiments, participants and field setting
The experiment followed most of the conventions used in CPR experiments (Ostrom et
al., 1994) in that it involves groups of eight subjects who participate in a series of rounds
where they make their individual decisions. For this particular experimental design, we
recruited in total 10 groups of 8 participants from three different villages in Colombia. In
each of the villages, the community members have joint access to a forested area from
which they derive most of their firewood, logging, hunting and water benefits.
Table 1
Two benchmarks for equilibria in the commons game
Social optimal solution Individual decision (X
opt) XS
opt=1





Nash solution Individual decision (X
nash) XS
nash=6
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separation between the desks so they could not look at another’s work. Except in
rounds where communication was allowed, the desks faced away from the center of the
circle. In each round, each subject would choose how many units of time, xia[0,8], to
spend collecting firewood from the experimental forest. Each individual received a
payoff table and the tables were common information. Each session began with
welcoming remarks where the subjects were told that the session would last approx-
imately 2 h. A monitor then read the instructions to the participants (see instructions
translated in Appendix C).
The groups played 8–11 initial rounds of the game, without knowing exactly how
many rounds the game would last, and not knowing a second series would be played with
different rules. During these initial rounds, individuals made their choices without
communicating with the others or the monitors. After this first stage, the monitors would
stop the game and announce a new set of rules for the forthcoming rounds. The monitor
read from a large poster, announcing that from then on, the group would be allowed to
have a 5-min open discussion before the decision for the next round. The discussion could
be about anything they wanted in relation to the game, but could not include threats or
promises of transfers of cash after the game. After the decision in each round, the
participants returned to their individual desks and made their individual and still private
decision. The groups played this sequence [discussion!individual decision] for about 9–
12 more rounds, and again without knowing the final round.
The average gain for a player during an entire session of about 18 rounds equaled—as
planned—the value of 1.5 to 2 days of work at the minimum local wage. This amount was
aimed at compensating them for participating in the game and a community workshop 2
days later was designed to discuss the experiment results and their experience with actual
institutions for managing local commons. In addition, they filled out an exit survey
questionnaire after the game with follow-up questions about the game, household data on
their economic activities, participation in social life and preferences about certain issues
related to our study.
4. Experimental results
The results from the 10 groups who participated under this symmetric payoffs
treatment are consistent with most of the experimental evidence in CPR situations
and also most public goods experiments. First, in a noncooperative game situation,
group outcomes neither achieve the social optimal solution, nor do they approach the
predicted symmetric Nash of purely selfish individuals. Secondly, the introduction of
face-to-face communication among group members has a positive impact on behavior
and earnings, despite the nonbinding condition of the discussions and the privacy of
decisions.
Fig. 1 shows the evolution of the choice variable x (months in the forest) over time for
the 10 groups (i.e. 80 individual decisions in each round), during the first and second stage
of the exercises. The graph plots the mean of the 80 decisions and one standard deviation
above and below the mean for those 80 observations.
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communication within the groups. Beginning in round 11 and through round 19, all groups
had 3–5 min for an open discussion before each decision round
4.
Fig. 1 shows, and statistical tests confirm, that on average, face-to-face communication
induced a reduction in x ¯i at the individual level which created partial social gains for the
groups. The x ¯i at the end of the noncommunication rounds was 4.38 months. The x ¯i at the
end of communication was 3.76 months. A nonparametric test (Wilcoxon–Mann–
Whitney) for the aggregate data confirms that communication induced a statistically
significant effect in behavior. Comparing the individual choices for the last three rounds
before communication to the last three after communication, the nonparametric test yields
a Z value of  3.2408 (p-value=0.0012). However, if we examine the data by groups, we
observe considerable variation in the degree of effectiveness. In Table 2, we compare the
choices (x ¯i) and the earnings of the two stages for each of the groups. Each of the 10 rows
represents a group, and the last row the average for all groups. The first two columns
Fig. 1. Average individual ‘‘months in the forest’’ over rounds.
4 Some groups—but not all—did play rounds 9 and 10, as well as roundsz19. We wanted to avoid the
problem of players knowing which was going to be the last round in each stage which in repeated games can
increase defection rates when approaching the last round. All groups played up to rounds 8 and 19 in each stage,
and these are the data we use for purposes of comparability in the analysis. However, within groups, we did not
observe a significant change during those last rounds compared to what was happening at round 19. .
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columns show the same information for the second stage of the game under communi-
cation.
Notice that most groups improved their payoffs, thanks to the possibility of face-to-
face communication during the second phase, between rounds, but that the gains from
such communication varied considerably given that the reduction in the average months in
each group varied also across groups. Further, a simple correlation test for the average
months before and after communication shows that there is no association between stages
so that higher levels of cooperation at the second stage might be the result of the same
behavior before communication. Those groups with higher earnings during the commu-
nication phase were not necessarily the groups with higher earnings during the no-
communication phase, eliminating the possibility that increased earnings during the
communication stage were simply due to a pattern of some groups increasing or
decreasing earnings over time.
4.1. Unexplained variation across groups
Notice that most groups did decrease the average ‘‘months in the forest’’ and therefore
increased their earnings. However, Table 2 and Fig. 1 show the wide variation in the
average behavior over stages and rounds, which translates into wide differences in the
outcomes at the group level. On the other hand, when examining the data within each
group, we see a fraction of individuals with xi choices on average close to 1 month—the
social optimum requirement, while other individuals appear to be following a strategy
close to the best response function given by the Nash prediction. Again, such variations
cannot be explained by the structure of incentives since all groups and players faced the
exact same structure in each round, and neither can they be explained by the rules before
and after communication, which were the same for all subjects.
Table 2
Average individual choices (X) and average individual earnings (Y$) by period (all rounds and last three rounds in
each stage)
Groups Choices (X) and earnings (Y$)
in Stage 1 (no communication)
Choices (X) and earnings (Y$)
in Stage 2 (communication)
All rounds stage 1 All rounds stage 2
X choice Y$ earnings X choice Y$ earnings
CQS11 4.96 296.64 2.39 584.64
CQW41 3.36 493.75 3.22 512.11
CEW42 4.72 327.94 3.89 434.79
CES12 4.82 316.64 3.57 473.60
CNW41 4.84 311.50 3.78 449.77
CES11 3.93 429.88 3.60 476.26
CNS12 3.74 454.76 4.44 355.86
CNW42 4.38 376.05 3.68 457.28
CNS11 4.86 309.68 3.94 414.85
CEW41 4.77 324.25 4.93 300.91
All groups 4.44 364.11 3.74 446.01
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problem by the participants
5, especially considering their low levels of schooling which
averaged less than 4 years (StdDev=2.798), while their age averaged little above 37 years
(StdDev=14.239). However, none of the demographic characteristics at the group and
individual levels, central or variance statistics showed significant relations at the partial or
multivariate regression analysis performed to explain variations in the choices or outcomes
at the first or second stages. Simple correlation tests were run between group average
behavior and the group average of these demographic variables to test for some
associations, but the results were not significant. Further, the tests run at the individual
level did not show either explanatory power of these variables. As it will be shown later,
other characteristics of the group composition, such as actual wealth, have much more
explanatory power of this variation.
From video observations and audio data that we taped during most of the sessions, it
appearsinsteadthatthevariationintheresultsiscloselyrelatedtohoweachgroupusedface-
to-face communication to induce changes in individual behavior and improve outcomes.
Thefamiliaritythatplayersshowedwiththeproblemandwitheachotherinthegroupvaried
tremendously, as well as the intensity and degree of participation in the conversations.
Two major elements emerged from the analysis of the conversations during the experi-
ments and from the community workshops as explanatory of the variability across and
within groups: first, the degree of familiarity of players with the dilemma being dealt with,
namely a local commons problem; second, the familiarity of a player with the others in the
group when dealing with solving the conflict of strategies that maximized individual vs.
group outcomes. The audio/video data suggested that economic factors that determined the
relation of players with the dilemma (i.e. with the resources for which there is joint access,
andwiththerest ofusers whohaveaccess tothem)mightexplainthedegrees of cooperation
andsocialefficiencyachievedbythedifferentgroups.Belowwepresentastatisticalanalysis
designed to capture such effects, first at a group and then at a micro level.
4.2. A group level analysis: familiarity with the problem and with each other
Of several types of indicators, economic variables such as occupation, sources of
income and wealth better explained the variability of the social efficiency achieved by the
10 groups. A simple example is shown in Fig. 2 where we plot vertically the average social
efficiency (simply the average earnings from Table 2 divided by the maximum possible of
645 points) achieved by each group in the last three rounds of communication; and in the
horizontal axis, the average real wealth of the eight participants in the group
6. To calculate
our indicator of household’s wealth, we estimated at local market prices the value for land,
livestock and equipment owned by the household of each participant, which they reported
5 One particular advantage of running experiments in the field is the much wider variation for these types of
attributes within the subjects pool, if we compare with similar experiments run with college students.
6 The group CEW41 in the graph deserves a note. In Table 1, it is the one group that did not improve the
results during the second stage. This group did not engage in any conversation that attempted to change the game
decisions, and devoted this time to thank the organizers for these activities, and to repeat that they were ‘‘...doing
just fine, and learning a lot’’.
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In order to make the wealth indicator comparable across the three villages, we adjusted the
estimated values by dividing each individual’s wealth by the village average, given the
large differences in land market prices across villages.
According to the audio and video tapes, participants often drew parallels with their own
experience using the local forest for extracting firewood, fibers or food. We wondered if
such familiarity with the problem might have an effect on the experimental results. The
group level and individual level analyses support this idea. Those with less land, livestock
and machinery equipment are usually households that depend highly on using the forest as
an important income source, and therefore face such dilemmas more frequently than those
who can better support themselves with their own assets.
The second dimension we examined was how familiar players felt with the other seven
participants intheirgroup. Some groups had conversationswhere one could sense closeness
among the players, while others had more formal and distant conversations. For instance, in
the very first round with communication, for the group that achieved the highest efficiency
(CQS11), one participant addressed the others with a warm and emphatic ‘‘compan ˜eritos!
(little buddies!) We are doing this wrong!’’, after which he went to explain how everyone
could be better off by following the group maximizing strategy of 1 month in the forest,
which in fact they achieved and maintained quite closely over time. Meanwhile, in other
groups, the dialogue was much more difficult and cold. For instance, when 2 days later the
Fig. 2. Group efficiency and group’s average real wealth.
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community, a participant who is well known as one of the wealthier ones locally energeti-
cally claimed that he was trying to convince the others that by bringing the months in the
forest down, they could all earn more cash. Another participant in his group then replied to
this contention by saying ‘‘I did hear Don _______ [name omitted] saying that but usually I
don’t see him in the face, I was not believing him much’’
7.
In order to test formally the hypothesis that the actual wealth of the participants affected
their individual behavior and the group outcome, let us start with the group level data and
the first regression estimations (see Table 3) of the average group choice and average level
of group efficiency for the last three rounds of communication, as functions of the average
wealth of the group, and of the groups’ wealth heterogeneity. For the latter, we use three
alternative measures of inequality, the standard deviation of wealth, the GINI coefficient
and the log of the variance of wealth, finding consistent outcomes across. A tenth group
(CEW41) was dropped from this estimation as a potential outlier, and supported on the fact
that it showed a clear dissimilarity—after reviewing the audio and video tapes—from the
common pattern throughout the other groups in improving cooperation after communica-
tion, and a much poorer understanding of the decision-making exercise and dilemma. The
exact same model was estimated for the 10-group data set showing poorer estimation
efficiency, although maintaining the same signs and findings. The last column to the right
in Table 3 shows the results including the tenth observation, and can provide an idea of the
loss in terms of overall econometric performance. The statistical results at individual and
round decision levels in the sections ahead, however, provide the evidence to reinforce this
first finding at the group level.
Table 3
Explaining average choices and group outcomes as a function of different inequality measures
Indep. variables Dependent variables (using data from last three rounds under communication)
Average X choice
(months in the forest)
Social efficiency
(% of maximum group earnings)
(*)















































N (no. groups) 9 9 9 9 9 9 10
Adj. R
2 0.9310 0.9127 0.9792 0.8867 0.8883 0.9496 0.5501
F-test (p-value) 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0006 0.0001 0.0254
In parenthesis are the p-values for Ho: Coeff.=0.
(*) Estimation including group CEW41.
7 Notice the difference between the ‘‘Don’’ and the ‘‘Compan ˜eritos’’.
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greatly enhanced by groups composed of players who are more familiar with local
commons dilemmas (lower wealth implying a greater dependence and familiarity), and by
groups composed of more homogenous players that can more easily devise self-governing
mechanisms to solve the dilemma. Since both effects, level of individual wealth and
heterogeneity of wealth within a group, may be playing both a role, we need to make sure
that their effects are not just because they are highly collinear—which they are as in many
cases with income and wealth data. Furthermore, the significance of the other proxies used
for group inequality in the regressions, which are less related to the units of average
wealth
8, also shows the same consistent result of a positive relation of group heterogeneity
and average months, which supports the notion that both factors play a separate and
combined effect on behavior and social efficiency. Causality in this case, despite being a
cross-section data set, can be defended on the grounds that the wealth characteristics
existed before the experimental behavior outcomes.
Notice that the results in Table 3 are based on data for the last three rounds of the
communication phase, and not for the entire subset of rounds. The reason for using the last
three rounds at the group level during the second stage, to study how wealth affected
behavior during the experiment, responds to the analysis, via the video and audio tapes, of
the learning and face-to-face communication processes where the agreements were being
built by each group. Only after a few rounds of the second stage the groups, some earlier
than others, were able to realize the social optimum solution and begun to implement it
through the face-to-face communication periods. By the middle of this second phase, most
groups had tried to device and enforce an agreement to lower their ‘months in the forest’,
and only during the last rounds of the phase we could actually test the success and
robustness of such agreement.
However, using the entire data set at the group level can be illustrative. Table 4 shows
the same estimated model for a data set where each observation of the dependent variable
is the average for all the rounds during the communication stage.
Although the negative signs remain for the relation between group cooperation and
wealth (average and inequality), the results are not as strong—except for the third column
model—when using the data for all the rounds of the communication phase for the reasons
just discussed. Once again, the smallness of sample size limits the possibilities of the
statistical analysis and therefore the need to lower the level of study to the individual and
round decision levels, as shown in the next section. Also, a time trend variable did not
increase the explanatory power of the model since there was no decrease in the
cooperation level over rounds, as is usually observed in linear public goods experiments.
It is also worth mentioning that the same regression model, when using the data from
the noncommunication stage, has much lower levels of explanatory power, suggesting that
the effects of real wealth in the behavior and outcomes are specially acting as a barrier to
cooperation during the face-to-face communication phase of the experiment.
8 The correlation coefficient between the average wealth for the group and the log of the variance of wealth
for the group is  0.4596, while the same correlation of average wealth with the standard deviation of wealth is
0.8982.
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It has been argued that wealth heterogeneity in these groups imposed a barrier to
an endogenous solution to the local commons dilemma. The group level analysis
suggests such argument, and the video and audio data provide additional elements to
explore the processes within the groups that create such barriers. Ultimately, the group
outcomes are the result of individual private decisions, and such decisions should then
be mediated by the institutional constraints within the face-to-face mechanism.
Table 5
Individual round choices as a function of reciprocity, wealth and social distance (t_data) (simple, fixed groups,
fixed individual models)
Indep. variables X choice (months in the forest) during all communication rounds
Simple OLS Fixed effects (groups) Fixed effects (individuals)
Intercept 2.3967 (0.0001) 1.6539 (0.0001) 0.7749 (0.0670)
DsumX(reduction)
by other 7 players
between (t 1) and t
a
 0.0235 (0.0379)  0.0244 (0.0308)  0.0271 (0.0026)




1.2299 (0.0001) 1.8223 (0.0001) 0.9197 (0.1373)
Wealth
a wealth distance  0.4094 (0.0001)  0.5760 (0.0001)  3.2542 (0.0001)
Fixed effects:
no. dummies not reported
09 7 2
N (including all 10 groups) 688 688 688
Adj. R
2 0.0949 0.1054 0.4342
F-test (p-value) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
a Defined as DELTSUM7= [lag(SUMX7) SUMX7]Z If DELTSUM7>0 then the other 7 players reduced
their months in the forest from the previous round. Thus, if the estimated coefficient is negative, a reduction by
the others is accompanied by a reduction by player i, implying a reciprocity effect.
b WLTHD2SA=@abs(Wealthi Swealthj/7), jp i.
Table 4
Replication of estimations in Table 3, using all rounds in the communication stage
Indep. variables AverageXchoice(monthsinthe forest)for allroundsinthesecondstage
Avg X Avg X Avg X
Intercept 2.970 (0.000) 2.858 (0.001) 2.044 (0.001)
Avg. wealthi 0.452 (0.564) 0.797 (0.070) 1.063 (0.003)
Std. Dev. wealth 0.288 (0.417) – –
Gini wealth – 0.133 (0.740) –
Variance of (log (wealthi)) – – 0.180 (0.018)
N (No. groups) 9 9 9
Adj. R
2 0.319 0.313 0.741
F-test (p-value) 0.134 0.137 0.007
In parenthesis are the p-values for Ho: Coeff.=0.
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explains the individual choices during this communication phase as a function of a
dynamic adjustment or a learning process, and of the nonmaterial incentives created
by the environment of trust and reciprocity emerging from the conversations among
these eight people in each round.
The results of such regression models are shown in Table 5, where we estimate the
individual xichoice (monthsinthe forest) during all rounds in thecommunicationphase asa
function of (i) the behavior by the others in the group in previous rounds and (ii) the
individualwealthandwealthdistancebetweentheindividualandtherestofthegroup.Inthe
case of the dynamic effect, we can provide a test for the hypothesis that players free-ride or
reciprocate as rounds go by and they observe what the others do. Basically, if a player
responds to others’ behavior as an opportunistic free-rider (or homo-economicus), she
shouldincreasehermonthsintheforestinroundt,iftherestofthegrouphaddecreasedtheir
months in the forest by round (t 1). On the other hand, if a player responds according to a
strategy of reciprocity, she should decrease her months in the forest when the others
decreased theirs, and increase if the other seven players increase as a negative reciprocity
response. Notice the incentives to free-ride as one moves towards the upper parts of the
payoffs table Appendix A used for the experiment. For testing such reciprocity hypothesis,
we can construct a variable that measures in each round the change in the sum of months in
the forest for the other seven players from the previous round, and include it as an
explanatory variable for individual behavior. Reciprocators should decrease their extraction
as a response to the others’ cooperation, while free-riders should increase theirs
9.
The proxy used for wealth distance is simply the absolute value of the difference
between one’s wealth and the average wealth of the other seven players in the group. Thus,
this analysis presumes each individual knows his/her relative wealth in comparison to
group members. This approach is supported by the closeness in which these participants
spend their daily lives in relation to other participants in the same village. We have also
included the cross-effect of wealth and wealth distance to test whether the marginal effect
of wealth distance on behavior might be different for individuals in different positions in
the wealth scale; in other words, whether the effect of the distance effect is the same for
rich than for poor individuals, an argument that also emerged during the workshops and
interviews.
The regressions run with data at the individual level, and using three different
estimation procedures, a simple ordinary least squares and two fixed effects models, are
shown in Table 5
10. The results confirm on the one hand the reciprocity effect in the
response in each round, and also suggest that individuals who were part of more
9 If the change is positive (Lagged(SumX  j) SumX  j), it means that the other seven players as a group
decreased their extraction of the forest, i.e. were willing to cooperate. If a player responds to such signal by
decreasing her months in the forest, it suggests a reciprocity effect, which would also apply to a player decreasing
her months if the change by the rest of the group was to be negative.
10 Recent concerns on experimental data have been emerging regarding the independence of observations,
and that there might be group fixed effects for every group of players, or individual fixed effects for a number of
decisions by one individual. Therefore, the three models, simple OLS, fixed group effects and fixed individual
effects, were estimated for the same data set.
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higher ‘‘months in the forest’’ at the end of the communication phase, i.e. were less willing
to cooperate. Further, there is no evidence of a trend towards the predicted Nash
equilibrium based on purely selfish maximization of payoffs, and in fact, there is no
statistical difference, within groups, of a difference in behavior between the beginning and
the end of the second phase under communication
11.
The negative and significant coefficient of about 0.025 for the variable (DsumX)
measuring the change in behavior in the last rounds by the rest of the group implies that
if the others decreased their sum of months by, say, 10 units, the average player reduced
her xi by 0.25 months. A positive coefficient is what the homo-economicus hypothesis
would have predicted that a reduction in the extraction by the others should be followed
by an increase in extraction by each player, up to the point of the symmetric Nash
equilibrium.
In the case of individual wealth which shows a positive and significant effect on X,
‘‘months in the forest’’, at least two—nonexclusive—explanations seem plausible. The
first argument is that lower levels of wealth can be associated with greater familiarity with
similar dilemmas in real life, given that less private alternatives increase the marginal value
of collective ones such as using joint access natural resources for self-consumption or
selling in the market, and therefore such individuals should have a better understanding of
the gains from mutual cooperation. In another paper (Cardenas, 2001), I discuss how for
these same 10 groups one can correlate the social efficiency achieved at the end of the
experiment with the percentage of players with their main income being from extractive
activities, or negatively with the percentage of players having land as their main income
source. A second possible explanation for a positive sign between wealth and level of free-
riding is that wealthier participants may show smaller marginal utilities from the cash
earned in the experiment, and therefore their marginal net utility from the effort to promote
and enforce a cooperative agreement would be much lower, or the marginal value of
potential losses is again smaller than for the poorer participants
12.
The hypothesis that wealth distance between a player and the rest of her group could
affect negatively cooperation is confirmed by the positive sign of such coefficient in Table
5, i.e. as the distance in wealth increases, so did the level of free-riding (increase in xi), and
the negative and significant sign for the cross-effect reinforces the argument that such
negative effect in cooperation was stronger for players in the lower levels of wealth within
the groups.
The great variation in the types of dialogues recorded during the sessions can
illustrate these arguments in a qualitative way, but lack of space here impedes us to
11 Also, there is no evidence either that behavior in the first phase under no communication affected
individual decisions in the second phase, controlling for other factors. If we compare the average decisions by the
last three rounds of the first phase and the first three in the communication phase, we obtain a correlation
coefficient, using individual players data, of 0.2621 only.
12 Thanks to Jaime Forero (Universidad Javeriana) for raising this possibility. The tapes show a great
variability in the effort that participants put into the conversations round after round for generating an agreement,
and following-up its fulfillment in the next round. However, it is not possible to identify each participant in the
tapes to its socioeconomic characteristics, since we did not labeled or tagged participants for the video recording
to allow a more informal setting for the discussions.
J.-C. Cardenas / Journal of Development Economics 70 (2003) 263–289 278expand on this statistical finding, except for the anecdote mentioned before regarding
the group where players were not following the advice by a wealthy participant. In a
further exercise using qualitative data analysis techniques on these audio and video
data, Lopez (2001) explored, using ‘focus groups’ techniques, the presence or absence
of the main elements that the experimental literature has suggested as explanatory of
why face-to-face communication increases cooperation in group dilemmas. Her results
illustrate how the groups that achieved the higher levels of social efficiency showed
dialogues that were more direct and horizontal among members of more homogenous
groups.
5. Final conclusions and comments
The results presented here expand the evidence on how wealth and group heterogeneity
may affect the possibilities of cooperation in groups by showing how actual individuals’
wealth and wealth distance affect cooperation in the experiment by reducing the
effectiveness of communication within the groups. However, the analysis departs from
the usual study of inequality and wealth affecting material outcomes and payoffs
structures, and explores how wealth may influence other nonpecuniary aspects of
cooperation and group dilemmas. In the case of experimental evidence, the results here
suggest that people may bring into the game some aspects regarding their wealth and
wealth relations to others, and that they might use such information strategically in the
decision-making (Cardenas and Ostrom, 2001). Do people bring this information about
their real context into the field lab, and do they use it for their decision? We believe so and
provide statistical support for it.
However, it should not be concluded from here that wealth and wealth heterogeneity
should always reduce cooperation in local commons dilemmas. Rarely in rural settings, the
nonmaterial incentives arising from wealth emerge without other forms of material
benefits and costs involved in the use of the commons, and these have inconclusive
effects on cooperation as the literature reviewed in Introduction suggests. Most likely,
wealthier households in communities have also different stakes at the commons dilemma,
and their willingness to cooperate will at the end depend on their valuation of the net
material and nonmaterial incentives. The same holds for the less wealthier who also face
similar balances of incentives. The poor might also show large stakes at the game if their
lack of economic assets makes them highly dependent on extracting resources at rates
beyond the capacity of the resource to renew itself.
By isolating the factors discussed in this experimental research, we can also derive
some implications for better policy design. Through a better understanding of the
composition of groups, one can forecast levels of cooperation emerging from self-
governance institutions and focus attention on intervening in settings where inequality
may create more difficulties for communities to solve the dilemma.
Finally, there are methodological lessons from this exercise, and in particular, the
advantages of bringing the experimental lab to the field and learn from observing the wider
variance in certain characteristics of the participants in the subject pool, if compared to
college students as usually done.
J.-C. Cardenas / Journal of Development Economics 70 (2003) 263–289 279Acknowledgements
This paper would not exist without the ideas and stimuli from Samuel Bowles and
Cleve Willis. Also, special thanks are given to Jeff Carpenter, Elinor Ostrom, John
Stranlund and James Walker. Very useful comments by two referees, and discussants at the
Workshop’s Colloquia (Indiana University), the MacArthur Network on Norms and
Preferences, the Public Choice/ESA 2000 meetings, and the Tokyo GDN2000 Global
Development Network Conference Research Medals Competition, are greatly appreciated.
In Colombia, I must thank the field practitioners and fellows from Humboldt, WWF and
Fundacion Natura who helped pre-test and conduct the experiments. Very special thanks
go to Luis Guillermo Baptiste and Sarah Hernandez at Humboldt, Carmen Candelo at
WWF and Juan Gaviria, Nancy Vargas and Danilo Salas with Natura at the time. Financial
support for the fieldwork was provided by the MacArthur Foundation, the Instituto de
Investigacion de Recursos Biologicos Alexander von Humboldt (Colombia), the WWF
Colombian program, Fundacion Natura-Colombia. Funding at later stages of the research
by Resources for the Future and MacArthur Research and Writing Grant is also
appreciated.
Appendix A. Payoff table
Their months My months in the forest
in the forest 012345678
0 619 670 719 767 813 856 896 933 967 0
1 619 669 717 764 809 851 890 926 959 1
2 617 667 714 760 804 845 883 918 950 2
3 615 664 711 756 798 838 875 909 940 3
4 613 660 706 750 792 831 867 900 929 4
5 609 656 701 744 784 822 857 889 917 5
6 605 651 695 737 776 813 847 877 905 6
7 600 645 688 729 767 803 836 865 891 7
8 595 638 680 720 757 792 824 852 877 8
9 588 631 672 711 747 780 811 838 862 9
10 581 623 663 700 735 768 797 823 846 10
11 573 614 653 689 723 755 783 808 830 11
12 565 605 642 678 711 741 768 792 813 12
13 556 594 631 665 697 726 752 775 795 13
14 546 583 619 652 683 711 736 758 776 14
15 536 572 606 638 668 695 719 739 757 15
16 525 560 593 624 653 678 701 721 737 16
17 513 547 579 609 636 661 683 701 717 17
18 501 534 565 594 620 643 664 681 696 18
19 488 520 550 578 603 625 645 661 674 19
20 475 506 535 561 585 606 625 640 653 20
21 461 491 519 544 567 587 605 619 630 21
22 447 476 502 527 548 567 584 597 608 22
23 433 460 485 509 529 547 563 575 585 23
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The payoffs for the experiments were generated by a simple model of a fixed number
of homogenous individuals where agents were instructed to view the game as if the
problem was to exploit a local forest for firewood. In each round of the game, each
individual is given an endowment of time e that can be allocated between collecting
firewood and providing labor to an unrelated market. Let xi denote the amount of time
individual i spends collecting firewood from the common, and let w denote the prevailing
wage for labor. Then, i’s decision to provide (e xi) units of labor to the formal sector
yields a payoff of w (e xi). Time spent collecting firewood from the forest yields a
private benefit, which we assume takes the form g(xi)=cxi /(xi)
2/2, where c and / are
Their months My months in the forest
in the forest 012345678
24 418 444 468 490 510 527 541 553 561 24
25 402 428 451 472 490 506 520 530 538 25
26 387 411 433 453 470 485 498 507 514 26
27 371 394 415 434 450 464 476 484 490 27
28 355 377 396 414 430 443 453 461 466 28
29 338 359 378 395 409 421 431 438 442 29
30 322 341 359 375 389 400 409 415 418 30
31 305 324 341 355 368 378 386 392 394 31
32 288 306 322 336 347 357 364 368 371 32
33 272 288 303 316 327 335 341 345 347 33
34 255 270 284 296 306 314 319 323 324 34
35 238 253 266 277 286 293 297 300 300 35
36 221 235 247 257 265 272 276 278 278 36
37 205 218 229 238 245 251 254 256 255 37
38 189 200 211 219 226 231 233 234 233 38
39 173 184 193 201 206 211 213 213 212 39
40 157 167 175 182 188 191 193 193 191 40
41 142 151 159 165 169 172 174 173 171 41
42 127 135 142 148 152 154 155 154 152 42
43 113 120 126 131 134 136 137 136 133 43
44 99 106 111 115 118 119 119 118 115 44
45 86 92 96 100 102 103 103 101 99 45
46 73 78 82 86 87 88 88 86 83 46
47 61 66 69 72 73 74 73 71 68 47
48 51 54 57 59 60 61 60 58 55 48
49 40 44 46 48 49 48 47 45 43 49
50 31 34 36 37 38 37 36 34 32 50
51 23 25 27 28 28 28 27 25 23 51
52 16 18 19 20 20 19 18 17 15 52
53 10 12 12 13 13 12 11 10 8 53
5 4 677777654 5 4
5 5 233333221 5 5
5 6 011111000 5 6
Appendix A (continued)
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concavity of g(xi) indicates diminishing marginal private returns to time spent collecting
firewood.
Subjects were told explicitly that their decision to spend time extracting firewood
would also affect water quality in the area adversely, for instance, because of erosion and
sedimentation at the upper watershed. We assumed that water quality q is a quadratic




0 is interpreted to be water quality in
the absence of firewood extraction. Again, these parameters are chosen in part to guarantee
q(Sxj)>0 for all feasible Sxj. An individual’s valuation of water quality is f(Sxj)=q(Sxj).
Define u(xi,Sxj) to be the sum of the sources of utility for an individual exploiter of the
local forest. Parameters were chosen, in part, to guarantee that u(xi,Sxj)>0 for all possible
xi and Sxj. To facilitate scaling individual payoffs, we take an individual’s payoff function
to be a positive, monotonic transformation F of u. In particular, F(u)=k(u)
g, where k and g
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Each group consisted of n=8 subjects, and each subject was allocated e=8 units of
time in each round. Pre-testing of the experimental designs at the University of
Massachusetts and at the Humboldt Institute for Biodiversity in Villa de Leyva,
Colombia led us to denominate units of time as months per year. Scale concerns led
us to choose the following final parameter values: k=(4/16,810), g=2, q
0=1372.8,
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Subjects were given the table of payoffs Appendix A as a function of individual
choices and the choices of all other participants. In each group, all subjects received
the same payoff table, and they were notified of this so that this was common
knowledge.
Nash strategies and the balance between self-interested and other-regarding behavior.
Because extracting firewood generates a pure public bad in the form of lower water
quality, standard theory predicts that purely self-interested individuals will spend more
time harvesting firewood than is socially optimal. Indeed, one common reference point for
experiments of this type is the one-shot, complete-information Nash equilibrium (the
standard model of purely self-interested strategic behavior) and another is the outcome at
which group welfare is maximized. Since the player’s payoffs are identical, optimality
requires symmetric individual choices. Let x denote the common amount of time each
individual spends collecting firewood in any symmetric outcome. Using Eq. (1), the joint





order condition for the maximization of W(x) requires  xn
2+c /x w=0. Solving
for x and substituting the actual parameter values yields optimal individual amounts of
time spent harvesting firewood, x*=(c w)/(/+n
2)=1. That is, if all eight players choose
1 month in the forest, the Pareto optimal solution is achieved, generating $645 in earnings
for each player in one round. The equivalent FOCs for the Nash symmetric equilibrium
corresponds to the case when each player chooses X
nash=6, with earnings in a round of
$155.
Appendix C. Experiment instructions (English translation)
These instructions were originally written in Spanish and translated from the final
version used in the field work. The instructions were read to the participants from this
script below by the same person during all sessions. The participants could interrupt and
ask questions at any time.
Whenever the following type of text and font, e.g. [...MONITOR: distribute
PAYOFFS TABLE to participants...] is found below, it refers to specific instructions
to the monitor at that specific point, when in italics, these are notes added to clarify
issues to the reader. Neither of these was read to participants. Where the word ‘‘poster’’
appears, it refers to a set of posters we printed in very large format with the payoffs
table, forms and the three examples described in the instructions. These posters were
hanged in a wall near to the participants’ desks and where the eight people could see
them easily.
The following exercise is a different and entertaining way of participating actively in a
project about the economic decisions of individuals. Besides participating in the exercise,
and being able to earn some prizes and some cash, you will participate in a community
workshop in 2 days to discuss the exercise and other matters about natural resources.
During the day of the workshop, we will give you the earnings you make during the game.
Besides a basic ‘‘show-up’’ prize for signing up and participating (examples: flash lamps,
machetes, school kits, home tools), you will receive a cash bonus that will be converted
into cash for purchases for your family. The funds to cover these expenditures have been
donated by various organizations that support this study among which we have the
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Natura.
C.1. Introduction
This exercise attempts to recreate a situation where a group of families must make
decisions about how to use the resources of, for instance, a forest, a water source, a
mangrove, a fishery, or any other case where communities use a natural resource. In the
case of this community _______ (name of the specific village), an example would be the
use of firewood or logging in the _______ (name of an actual local commons area in that
village) zone. You have been selected to participate in a group of eight people among those
that signed up for playing. The game in which you will participate now is different from
the ones others have already played in this community; thus, the comments that you may
have heard from others do not apply necessarily to this game. You will play for several
rounds equivalent, for instance, to years or harvest seasons. At the end of the game you
will be able to earn some prizes in kind and cash. The cash prizes will depend on the
quantity of points that you accumulate after several rounds.
C.2. The PAYOFFS TABLE
To be able to play you will receive a PAYOFFS TABLE equal to the one shown in the
poster. [...MONITOR: show PAYOFFS TABLE in poster and distribute PAYOFFS
TABLE to participants...].
This table contains all the information that you need to make your decision in each
round of the game. The numbers that are inside the table correspond to points (or pesos)
that you would earn in each round. The only thing that each of you has to decide in each
round is the number of MONTHS that you want to allocate EXTRACTING THE
FOREST (in the columns from 0 to 8).
To play in each round you must write your decision number between 0 and 8 in a
yellow GAME CARD like the one I am about to show you. [...MONITOR: show
yellow GAME CARDS and show in the poster...] It is very important that we keep in
mind that the decisions are absolutely individual, that is, that the numbers we write in
the game card are private and that we do not have to show them to the rest of
members of the group if we do not want to. The monitor will collect the eight cards
from all participants, and will add the total of months that the group decided to use
extracting the forest. When the monitor announces the group total, each of you will be
able to calculate the points that you earned in the round. Let us explain this with an
example.
In this game, we assume that each player has availability of a maximum of 8 MONTHS
to work each year extracting a resource like firewood or logs. In reality, this number could
be larger or smaller but for purposes of our game we will assume 8 as maximum. In the
PAYOFFS TABLE, this corresponds to the columns from 0 to 8. Each of you must decide
from 0 to 8 in each round. But to be able to know how many points you earned, you need
to know the decisions that the rest in the group made. That is why the monitor will
announce in each round the total for the group. For instance, if you decide to use 2 months
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gain ____ points. Let us look at two other examples in the poster.
[...MONITOR: show poster with the THREE EXAMPLES...].
Let us look how the game works in each round.
C.3. The DECISIONS FORM
To play each participant will receive one green DECISIONS FORM like the one shown
in the poster in the wall. We will explain how to use this sheet. [...MONITOR: show the
DECISIONS FORM in the poster and distribute the DECISIONS FORMS...].
With the same examples, let us see how to use this DECISIONS FORM. Suppose
that you decided to play 5 in this round. In the yellow GAME CARD, you should write
5. Also, you must write this number in the first column A of the decisions form. The
monitor will collect the eight yellow cards and will add the total of the group. Suppose
that the total added 26 months. Thus, we write 26 in the column B of the decisions
form. [...MONITOR: In the poster, write the same example numbers in the respective
cells...].
To calculate the third column (C), we subtract from the group total, MY MONTHS IN
THE FORESTand then we obtain THEIR MONTHS IN THE FORESTwhich we write in
column C. In our example, 26 5=21. If we look at the PAYOFFS TABLE, when MY
MONTHS are 5 and THEIR MONTHS are 21, I earn ___ points. I write then this number
in the column D of the DECISIONS FORM.
It is very important to clarify that nobody, except for the monitor, will be able to know
the number that each of you decide in each round. The only thing announced in public is
the group total, without knowing how each participant in your group played. Let us repeat
the steps with a new example. [...MONITOR: Repeat with the other two examples,
writing the numbers in the posters hanging in the wall...].
It is important repeating that your game decisions and earnings information is private.
Nobody in your group or outside of it will be able to know how many points you earned
or your decisions during rounds. We hope these examples help you understand how the
game works, and how to make your decisions to allocate your MONTHS in each round
of the game. If at this moment you have any question about how to earn points in the
game, please raise your hand and let us know. [...MONITOR: pause to resolve
questions...].
It is very important that while we explain the rules of the game you do not engage in
conversations with other people in your group. If there are no further questions about the
game, then we will assign the numbers for the players and the rest of forms needed to
play.
C.4. Preparing for playing
Now write down your player number in the green DECISIONS FORM. Write also the
place ___ and the current date and time __/__/__, __:__am/pm. In the following poster, we
summarize for you the steps to follow to play in each round. Please raise your hand if you
have a question. [MONITOR: Read the steps to them from the poster].
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monitor will announce one additional rule for this group. To start the first round of the
game, we will organize the seats and desks in a circle where each of you face
outwards. The monitor will collect in each round your yellow game cards. Finally, to
get ready to play the game, please let us know if you have difficulties reading or
writing numbers and one of the monitors will seat next to you and assist you with
these. Also, please keep in mind that from now on no conversation or statements
should be made by you during the game unless you are allowed to. We will have first a
few rounds of practice that will NOT count for the real earnings, just for your
practicing of the game.
Objective of the game: To earn as much points as possible at the end of the rounds,
which will be converted into cash prizes for your household.
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0 and 8, you want to devote to extract resources from a forest. The points you earn in each
round depend on your decision and the decisions by the rest of the group, according to the
PAYOFFS TABLE (blue table).
What do you need: To play you need a blue PAYOFFS TABLE, a green DECISIONS
FORM and several yellow GAME CARDS. Also you need a player number.
Steps to play in each round:
(1) Using the blue PAYOFFS TABLE, decide how many MONTHS IN THE FOREST you
will play.
(2) In the DECISIONS FORM write your decision (MY MONTHS IN THE FOREST) in
Column A for the round being played at that moment.
(3) In a yellow GAME CARD write the round number, and your decision MY MONTHS IN
THE FOREST. Make sure it corresponds to the DECISIONS FORM. Hand the yellow
game card to the monitor.
(4) Wait for the Monitor to calculate the total from all the cards in the group. The Monitor
will announce the TOTAL GROUP MONTHS.
(5) In the green DECISIONS FORM write this total in Column B (TOTAL GROUP
MONTHS IN THE FOREST).
(6) In the green DECISIONS FORM calculate Column C (THEIR MONTHS IN THE
FOREST) equals to Column B minus Column A.
(7) In the green DECISIONS FORM write in Column D the total points you earned for
this round. To know how many points you made, use the PAYOFFS TABLE and
columns A and C (MY MONTHS and THEIR MONTHS). We will also calculate this
quantity with the yellow cards to verify.
(8) Let us play another round (Go back to step 1).
Rule A: THERE IS NO COMMUNICATION WITHIN THE GROUP
Besides the rules described in the instructions that we just explained, there is an additional rule for the
participants in this group:
You will not be able to communicate with any member of your group before, during or after you make your
individual decision in each round. Please do not make any comment to another participant or to the group in
general. After the last round we will add the points you earned in the game.
Rule B: COMMUNICATION WITH MEMBERS OF THE GROUP
Besides the rules described in the instructions that we just explained, there is an additional rule for the
participants in this group:
Please make a circle or sit around a table with the rest of your group. Before making your decision in each
round, you will be able to have an open discussion of maximum 5 min with the members of your group.
You will be able to discuss the game and its rules in any fashion, except you cannot use any promise or
threat or transfer points. Simply an open discussion. The rest of the rules hold.
We will let you know when the 5 min have ended. Then you will suspend the conversation and should make
your individual decision for the next round. These decisions will still be private and individual as in the past
rounds and cannot be known to the rest of the group or other people.
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